Part 26
By Hijaz Tamim
Covert Financing of ISIS Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) by Western Extremist Supporters
In recent years, the financial resources of ISIS have emerged as a decisive factor behind the group’s continued activity, global reach, and operational endurance. Research conducted across different regions of the world shows that ISIS’s funding is not limited to local sources such as oil sales, looting, extortion, taxation, or charitable donations. Rather, a broad and covert support network operating in Europe and other Western countries has played a significant role in financing foreign terrorist fighters.
This network constitutes one of the most critical lifelines for ISIS and holds exceptional importance for sustaining its international operations.
Analysis of the activities of European extremist supporters reveals that they generate funds for ISIS through microfinance schemes, small but continuous fundraising efforts, and deliberate evasion of financial oversight mechanisms. These activities include the abuse of charitable organizations, the establishment of fake commercial companies, fraud within social welfare systems, illegal acquisition of bank loans, VAT tax fraud, and the use of cash couriers.
Through these channels, not only are the travel, training, equipment, and operations of ISIS fighters financed, but serious challenges are also created for Western security agencies in terms of detection and monitoring.
European extremist supporters employ a wide range of methods to collect funds for ISIS. For example, money service businesses (MSBs) operating in border cities between Turkey and Syria, such as Western Union, MoneyGram, and similar services, have been widely used to transfer funds from Europe to ISIS-controlled areas.
In addition, the hawala system, an informal money transfer network, is regarded as one of the most important financial conduits for ISIS. Because it operates outside the control of international banking systems, hawala enables funds to be transferred through concealed and complex channels that are difficult to trace.
The flow of foreign fighters from Europe to the conflict zones of Syria and Iraq to join ISIS reached unprecedented levels. According to several reports, approximately five thousand citizens of European Union countries joined ISIS following the outbreak of the Syrian civil war. The financial support for these journeys was organized with precision and discipline by European extremist supporters to ensure that fighters had sufficient resources for travel.
The primary objective of these supporters is to ensure that every fighter becomes a source of funding for the group through his personal wealth and social connections. Through this mechanism, fighters are granted higher status and opportunities for influence within ISIS-held areas, which in turn intensifies their efforts to raise funds.
Some European extremist supporters, drawing on prior criminal experience, rely on illegal means to collect money. These include pickpocketing, banking fraud, tax fraud, and abuse of social welfare systems to finance travel and logistical needs.
Such activities are particularly associated with individuals who grew up in complex family environments, possess criminal backgrounds, or have previously been involved in organized crime. The funds collected through these methods provide vital resources for fighters’ travel, equipment, and settlement within ISIS-controlled territories.
Cases involving banking fraud and VAT tax fraud, in particular, highlight the seriousness of this issue. According to reports, in Sweden, a 30-year-old Salafi preacher collected approximately 740,000 US dollars for ISIS through VAT fraud. Various cases in the United Kingdom and Denmark similarly demonstrate how extremist supporters raised funds for ISIS through bank loans, social welfare fraud, and fake commercial enterprises.
These cases clearly indicate that the financial support provided to foreign fighters from Europe is not sporadic or incidental, but rather a systematic and organized process that poses serious challenges to legal oversight and regulatory control.
Cash couriers, prepaid cards, and crowdfunding via social media platforms constitute key components of this financial network. These methods are used to transfer funds from Europe to ISIS territories and are of vital importance for sustaining ISIS operations, equipment, and local support networks.
At the same time, this network is also used to provide financial support to ISIS sympathizers within Europe itself, thereby creating a critical financial infrastructure for international terrorist operations. In conclusion, the covert financing of foreign fighters by Western extremist supporters represents a central pillar of ISIS’s global activity. Analyzing, monitoring, and disrupting this network is a strategic necessity for the international community in the fight against ISIS.
Efforts to identify and dismantle this network not only restrict ISIS’s financial resources but are also essential for preventing the movement of fighters within Europe, neutralizing extremist networks, and safeguarding global security. Through the study of this network, valuable insights can be gained into ISIS’s international financial structures, the expansion of local support bases, and the interconnections between extremist networks.
These findings provide a foundational guide for strategic planning by law enforcement agencies, intelligence services, and international financial monitoring bodies.
