Part 10
By Dr. Humam Khan
The Role and Influence of Islam in the Formation of the Pakistani Military
It can be stated without any doubt or hesitation that in shaping the ideology and beliefs of the Pakistani military, the sacred religion of Islam was given virtually no meaningful role. On the contrary, the fundamental teachings of Islam were systematically ignored. Of course, after the creation of Pakistan, one change did take place: the military learned to use Islam skillfully as a tool to stir the emotions of its soldiers and officers, to keep alive in them the passions of life and death for the sake of the nation.
Most efforts to give an Islamic identity to the military’s ideology occurred during the rule of Zia-ul-Haq. Examples include Professor Colonel Abdul Qayyum’s book “On Striving to be a Muslim” and Brigadier S.K. Malik’s work “The Quranic Concept of War.” These writings were not produced by scholars deeply versed in Quranic exegesis, Hadith, jurisprudence, or other religious sciences. They were written by military officers themselves.
If we assume the best, it could be said that these might have been well-intentioned efforts by individual officers. But the practical reality is that these books and similar attempts, without bringing any fundamental change to the military’s core ideology, beliefs, or practices, serve only to convince a soldier that he is engaged in a great act of worship called jihad. That obedience to his officer is a religious duty. And that if he is killed, he will attain the high rank of martyrdom.
But what about the real questions?
– What is the true definition of jihad in Islam?
– What is the religious ruling on fighting for one’s nation?
– What legitimate objectives does jihad have?
– Who are the friends and enemies of Muslims?
– What are the limits of obedience to an Amir, and in what situations is disobedience required?
– Who is considered a martyr?
– Under what conditions is martyrdom accepted?
– What rules and principles has Sharia laid down for warfare?
All of these questions are either completely ignored or given no proper Islamic answer.
It is fair to say with confidence that most Pakistani military officers and soldiers do not understand that the fundamental purpose of jihad is “I’la Kalimat Allah”, to elevate the word of monotheism, to eradicate polytheism, to establish Sharia, and to end the dominance of disbelievers. The ignorance of these foundational concepts produced some revealing moments. When Pakistani soldiers were killing the Muslims of Bengal, they cited the examples of Badr and Uhud to justify it. And the soldiers who shed the blood of Arab mujahideen were themselves called mujahideen.
That is why, during the events of 1971, General Tikka Khan addressed the forces on the eastern front and said:
“A small group of Muslims, through their connection to jihad and Islam, defeated the most powerful enemies. The battles of Badr, Uhud, Khyber, and Damascus are proof of what Muslims can achieve.”
Similarly, in 2004, during the fighting against Arab and non-Arab mujahideen in the Wana area of Waziristan, Brigadier Khattak told his soldiers:
“The real mujahideen are my soldiers. The real mujahideen are you!”
Therefore, it can be said with complete confidence that even today, in terms of its fundamental ideology, thought, and philosophy, this military remains the same Royal Indian Army trained by the British at Sandhurst and Dehradun. The only difference is that now, to veil themselves in Islamic sentiment, military centers are decorated with slogans of “Iman, Taqwa, and Jihad fi Sabilillah.” Yet this military is as far removed from these three realities today as it was in 1857.
What is even more dangerous is that the same un-Islamic objectives are now being pursued under the cover of religious fervor.
When summarizing the military’s core ideology, Stephen P. Cohen writes explicitly:
“All Muslim countries that gained independence inherited armies trained by the West… Therefore, these armies are reluctant to abandon the theories of Clausewitz, Liddell Hart, and Schilling. Most officers of the Pakistani military will never abandon these theories.”
(The Pakistan Army: History and Organization, Stephen P. Cohen, p. 107)
