Part 1
Author: Walid Nizam
The caliphate, by its very nature, represents a noble cause, and assuming the role of a caliph is a weighty and complex responsibility—contrary to the simplistic portrayal offered by ISIS, the modern-day Khawarij. The terrorist organization ultimately weaponized the revered black flag, adorned with Islamic inscriptions, to commit atrocities that severely damaged the sanctity of both the caliphate and the caliph himself.
At the outset of ISIS’s self-proclaimed caliphate, the Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar revealed in an investigative report that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, as ISIS’s leader, spent fourteen consecutive months securing covert supporters who would authorize him to declare himself caliph. His aim was not merely to be Amir al-Mu’minin but to establish himself as the rightful caliph. Through his spokesman, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, al-Baghdadi declared himself a “Wājib al-ṭāʿah” (obligatory to obey) caliph upon the formal announcement.
Superficially, this declaration appeared to seek the revival of the Islamic caliphate, which had fallen centuries earlier at the hands of Atatürk. ISIS’s rhetoric boldly proclaimed the erasure of the “Sykes-Picot” borders, heralding a caliphate that would unify all Muslims under its rule.
According to ISIS’s narrative, pledging allegiance (bay’ah) to the caliph was mandatory for all Muslims, and refusal was a crime punishable by death. Al-Adnani declared: “I call you to unity in this matter, but if anyone refuses, their head must be severed.”
Subsequently, ISIS-aligned Salafi scholars issued fatwas rationalizing their political enterprise. They claimed the caliphate would unify Muslim nations under a single polity, restoring global dominance through scientific centers, universities, and industrial facilities. In their rhetoric, the caliph was destined to rule the entire earth—not merely lead a transient government.
Yet, given ISIS’s predatory and deceitful nature, both their caliphate and their caliph were fabrications. Their promises—freeing prisoners, appointing judges, and spreading religious knowledge—proved hollow. In reality, their only consistent actions were extorting civilians under the guise of taxation and accumulating wealth through coercion.
ISIS could not even tolerate the opinions or counsel of the senior scholars in Iraq and Syria; criticism and opposition were met with lethal retribution. Notably, their supposed caliph could not even present himself to his own ranks for public allegiance, reflecting the profound atmosphere of mistrust that prevailed within the organization.
In response to ISIS’s announcement, Abdullah Azzam (a disgruntled ISIS member), speaking from Lebanon, emphasized that no strategic benefit or religious merit existed in declaring a caliphate at that time. Rather, he warned, such a premature and illegitimate declaration would inflict serious harm upon Islam, and he urged that it be nullified as swiftly as possible.
Another Salafi scholar derided ISIS’s declaration as a “conference of folly,” observing that the group’s structure lacked even the basic features of a functioning state. He highlighted their absence of economic and educational expertise, portraying the movement instead as a succession of suicidal operations that would only fragment and weaken the Muslim community. Others argued that ISIS’s caliphate was not a religious revival but a ploy to seize oil-rich lands in Iraq and Syria.
