Part 4
By Aziz Jalal
The 2003 Iraq War
The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 sparked a blaze from which ISIS would later emerge. This destructive war did far more than topple Iraq’s political order; it dismantled the country’s social foundations, fractured its security institutions, and plunged the entire nation into prolonged turmoil. George W. Bush’s decision to pursue regime change, made without a careful appraisal of the long-term regional consequences, created a fertile ground in which violent extremism could easily take root and grow unchecked.
Saddam Hussein ruled with an authoritarian hand, yet his regime had maintained a degree of stability across Iraq. With its collapse, that stability vanished almost overnight and the country spiraled into disorder.
Among the most fateful decisions taken during the occupation was the order issued by the senior American administrator, Paul Bremer, to dissolve the Iraqi national army. In an instant, more than 400,000 trained soldiers were left without employment, without purpose, and without a place in the new political order. Many of these men, embittered and disenfranchised, later filled the ranks of insurgent groups. The policy created an entire generation whose only real expertise was warfare and who now found themselves shut out of the emerging system.
The American policy of De-Ba’athification compounded the crisis even further. By removing every Ba’ath Party member from public service and government administration, the United States discarded decades of accumulated bureaucratic and institutional experience.
This produced a class of displaced administrators and mid-level officials who felt excluded from the new order, and many ultimately gravitated toward armed resistance. These decisions widened the political vacuum and deepened the instability of the already fragile post-war environment.
Amid this chaos, militant groups began to grow in strength. The sectarian tensions between Shia and Sunni communities, long present but sharply intensified after Saddam’s fall, gave these groups a sense of justification and religious legitimacy.
The occupation also drew thousands of fighters from across the region and beyond. For these foreign fighters, Iraq became both a battleground against the United States and a proving ground for their extremist ambitions. The networks established during this period later formed the early structural roots of what would become ISIS.
The creation of the Awakening Councils was yet another policy whose consequences unfolded in unexpected ways. These Sunni councils were initially established to counter al-Qaeda mujahidin, but many of their trained members eventually drifted toward ISIS. By organizing, training, and arming these councils, the United States helped cultivate a cadre of seasoned fighters who would later turn their weapons against the very power that had equipped them.
Iraq’s devastated post-war economy added another layer of fuel to the fire. Widespread unemployment, especially among Sunni youth, pushed countless young men toward insurgent activities as they searched for purpose, income, or belonging. At the same time, America’s standing in the region plummeted.
The images of torture from Abu Ghraib, along with reports of civilian casualties, fostered intense resentment and hostility toward America. Over time, this hostility became one of the most powerful instruments in ISIS’s propaganda machine.
In the end, the invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq created all the conditions necessary for militant groups to thrive: an unfilled power vacuum, social and political dissatisfaction, sectarian conflict, the influx of foreign fighters, and an economy in ruins. ISIS did not emerge out of nowhere. It was the unforeseen consequence of a series of strategic miscalculations made by the United States in Iraq. The very sparks that Bush cast across the Middle East in the hope of establishing democracy ultimately nurtured a force that would, years later, engulf the entire region in flames.
