Part 2
By Akbar Jamal
The history of international relations and intelligence work proves one thing clearly. Bringing a state under foreign influence does not always require military invasion or sending in armies of spies. In today’s geopolitical world, the most successful model of infiltration is one in which the target state opens the door itself, handing over its strategic assets, policy-making institutions, and even its highest executive offices to people who ultimately serve foreign interests.
This kind of hidden influence does not spread through guerrilla warfare. It grows out of economic dependence, the erosion of constitutional rule, and an alliance with an elite whose lives and future are no longer deeply tied to their own homeland. Once the methods and objectives of that influence are examined closely, what emerges is a complicated and dangerous game of politics and economics. For foreign intelligence agencies, a country’s economic dependence is the widest gateway through which influence begins to flow. Put simply, financial aid and development programs have become the most effective and legitimate way to enter another state’s system. When weak governance and economic disorder leave a country permanently dependent on foreign loans and assistance, outside powers and financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank no longer have to struggle for influence. The door is already open.
Those loans and bailout packages arrive with strict conditions, foreign advisers, and economic experts who gradually gain long-term influence over the country’s financial lifelines. The result is a form of economic remote control that leaves the state unable to make independent decisions. Budget deficits, tax policy, electricity and gas prices, and even the appointment of the central bank governor all begin to reflect outside pressure.
Under such circumstances, the parliament of a republic becomes little more than a rubber stamp, while the country’s financial brain is effectively placed under foreign management. That dependence becomes the foundation on which foreign influence turns into an organized system. The second major path for that influence is the vacuum created by military rule, where the authority of the entire state is concentrated in the hands of one man or a small circle.
This raises an important question. How does economic dependence and foreign pressure gain legitimacy and support inside the country?
The answer lies in the alliance between politics and the military, what can be called the security vacuum created by military rule. There is a common belief that military institutions are difficult for foreign intelligence services to penetrate. History tells a different story.
In a functioning political system, foreign powers face many obstacles. Parliament, the opposition, an independent judiciary, a free press, and an alert public all stand in their way.
But once military rule concentrates all decision-making authority in the hands of a single ruler or a narrow inner circle, influencing that one ruler becomes the quickest and easiest way to control the entire system.
A military ruler lacks the legitimacy that comes from the people’s vote. To remain in power, he needs foreign backing, political recognition, and financial support. Under those conditions, even decisions affecting the country’s sovereignty may come under outside pressure. Pakistan’s policy under General Pervez Musharraf after the events of 9/11 is one of the clearest examples.
Following pressure from Washington, and without broad parliamentary debate or constitutional consultation, Pakistan joined the American war against Afghanistan. It handed over its airspace, logistics, and intelligence networks to support American operations against the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA). That single decision became the starting point of Pakistan’s bloody twenty-year internal conflict. Yet for Musharraf himself, it brought the status of a “frontline ally” and secured his position in power.
When a military establishment becomes absorbed in political interference, pressuring judges, and controlling the media, it neglects its real intelligence responsibilities. The result is that foreign networks find it even easier to penetrate the country’s information infrastructure, communications systems, and economic corridors. In that sense, Pakistan’s military elite has long played the role of a “Lawrence of Pakistan” and a comprador elite, clearing the way for outside influence.
There is a well-known principle in intelligence and statecraft. Institutions are run by people, so if you want to change a system, target the people who run it.
This is also the most dangerous aspect of foreign influence. Outside powers place technocrats and individuals in senior positions who, in practice, represent foreign interests instead of their own people. In international politics, this class is known as the comprador elite.
Pakistan’s former Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, who emerged during General Musharraf’s rule, is a clear example. Before entering politics, he was a senior executive at Citibank and had spent most of his life in the United States and other foreign countries. He was suddenly brought back to Pakistan, special arrangements were made for his citizenship documents and electoral constituency, and he was first appointed finance minister before becoming prime minister.
In geopolitical terms, such figures can be called the “Lawrences of Pakistan,” people who wear their country’s clothes and occupy its highest offices, yet whose intellectual outlook, financial interests, and family ties remain connected to foreign centers of power.
During Shaukat Aziz’s time in office, national assets were sold under the banner of privatization, while the economy became addicted to a short-term consumer model built on borrowing. When General Musharraf’s rule weakened and Aziz’s time ended, he packed his bags and returned abroad. Today he bears none of Pakistan’s burdens and has no stake in its future. This is perhaps the ugliest form of foreign influence. Foreign managers arrive, carry out their mission, and leave, while entire nations are left to bear the consequences of their decisions for generations.
This second discussion of foreign intelligence penetration shows that outside influence almost always grows out of a country’s own internal weaknesses. When a military establishment sidelines the people and upholds military rule, it ends up serving as a facilitator for foreign powers. Institutions like the United States and the IMF do not need secret guerrilla networks to gain influence in Pakistan. Pakistan’s dependent elite, together with the military regime’s need to survive, already provides them with all the access they need. Until decision-making power rests in the hands of the people’s genuine representatives, and until those who serve foreign interests under the label of technocrats, the “Lawrences of Pakistan,” are removed from the highest offices of the state, the country’s independence will remain little more than a dream on paper, while its real reins remain in the hands of others beyond its borders.
