(Part 29)
By Abu Rayyan Hamidi
Size of the Meccan Army:
It was the third year of Hijrah, the seventh day of Shawwal. The Meccan polytheists, in coordination with neighboring tribes, assembled an army of three thousand men. Among them were fifteen women from the Quraysh, as well as slaves and attendants, who were tasked with boosting the morale of the fighters through war songs and stirring poetry.
The overall commander of the army was Abu Sufyan, with subordinate commanders leading their respective groups. Among those participating was Abu Uzza al-Jumahi, who had been captured at Badr and released by the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) without ransom, under the promise that he would no longer fight against the Muslims. However, he broke this pledge and was now part of the army fighting once again against the Muslims.
Where is the polytheist, and where is the fulfillment of a promise
The commander of the cavalry was Khalid ibn Walid, with ʿIkrimah ibn Abu Jahl as his deputy. The army’s flanks were held by the Banu Abd Dar, accompanied by three thousand camels and two hundred horses, none of which were left unmounted, along with seven hundred armed warriors.
In terms of number and strength, this army was far larger and more powerful than the Muslim forces. Filled with fervor and zeal, it marched toward Medina, its hearts burning with the flames of revenge, seeking to avenge the devastating defeat they had suffered at Badr.
Intelligence Report to the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH)
Abbas ibn Abdul Muttalib was in Mecca, monitoring all enemy movements. When the army of disbelief set out from Mecca, Abbas immediately sent a messenger to the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) in Medina. In a letter, he reported the enemy’s movements and military preparations.
The messenger covered the 500-kilometer distance between Mecca and Medina in three days and reached the Prophet while he was at Masjid Quba. Abbas handed over the letter, which included the enemy’s numbers, the scale of their military strength, and details of their mobilization.
The Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) did not rely solely on this single intelligence source. He also sent Hubab ibn Munzir toward the Quraysh to further verify the information, and Hubab returned confirming the same details.
However, to prevent the morale of the Muslims from weakening and to ensure they were not intimidated by the enemy’s strength, the Prophet instructed the Companions to keep this information confidential and not to inform anyone else.
Preparations for Emergencies by the Muslims
In Medina, the following steps were taken to prepare for emergencies:
Since the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) was the primary target, a special group was appointed to protect him. This group included Saʿd ibn ʿUbadah, Saʿd ibn Muʿadh, and Asid ibn Ḥudhayr, who were among the leaders of the Ansar. They stayed close to the Prophet, accompanying him to ensure he would not be struck by enemy arrows.
Other groups were assigned to guard the roads and gates leading into Medina, patrolling all entrances to the city. Additionally, scouts were appointed to monitor potential routes the enemy might take to approach Medina.
The Prophet Muhammad’s (PBUH) Consultative Meeting
Once the full intelligence about the enemy was gathered, the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) convened a meeting with the Companions to consult on the battle plan. During this meeting, two proposals emerged:
1. The Prophet’s own opinion was to remain in Medina, fortify the city, and prepare defensive positions. If the polytheists attempted to enter Medina, they would face resistance in all streets and alleys, with women throwing stones from the rooftops as needed. This was considered the best course of action. Even the leader of the hypocrites, Abdullah ibn Ubayy (Ibn Sullul), agreed with this plan, possibly because it offered a way to avoid direct combat without attracting attention, rather than because he genuinely supported a strategic or tactical military perspective.
This proposal was based on the following points and reasoning:
1. The Meccan army was composed of various tribes and clans, making long-term cohesion unlikely. Even if Medina were besieged, it would only be effective for a short period, after which internal disputes would likely arise within the enemy ranks.
2. Attacking well-fortified cities that have taken adequate defensive measures is inherently difficult, especially when both sides have comparable weapons and equipment.
3. Defenders who are among their families tend to fight with greater determination to protect their households, ensuring the safety of their women and children.
4. Women and children would also participate in the defense, effectively doubling the number of defenders in the battle.
5. The defenders would use weapons that could have a significant impact on the enemy ranks, such as throwing stones. Stones were not available to the enemy, nor did they have any special preparations to defend against them, making this an additional advantage for the defenders.
The second proposal will be covered in the next section, Insha’Allah.
