Author: Nizam Muhajir
Between 2013 and 2019, ISIS actively pursued a complex strategy to present itself as a large and formidable threat, aiming to expand and strengthen its global influence. The group sought to project itself as an uncontrollable international menace.
In the military and operational spheres, ISIS enforced a policy of terror, brutality, and mercilessness—sparing no form of crime or cruelty. This included mass killings of civilians, ruthless executions, burnings, drownings, and countless other atrocities, all central to its broader strategic agenda.
The second aspect of this policy was a calculated media strategy—turning real-world atrocities into tools of psychological warfare. Through social media and propaganda videos, ISIS dramatically exaggerated its power, using fear as a weapon. At its peak, the group relied heavily on media influence to cement its image as a formidable global threat.
Many governments and media outlets, particularly Western states and their intelligence and media networks, actively reinforced ISIS’s strategy of exaggerating its power. This served to justify military actions, domestic policies, and foreign interventions. While ISIS was indeed a real global threat, its actual strength and danger were far weaker than portrayed or inflated.
Even at the height of ISIS’s so-called caliphate or during the peak of its Khorasan branch, there were no major instances where the group posed a direct, large-scale threat to the world or Western nations, nor did it successfully carry out a significant attack on government targets.
Years after the fall of the ISIS caliphate, its branches have splintered, ISIS-K has suffered significant defeats, and its leadership and organizational structure have been severely weakened. Yet, despite all this, ISIS-K continues to be portrayed by international actors as a major global threat, remaining a focal point for media and global institutions.
But is the actual threat of ISIS-K truly as significant as the extensive propaganda and concerns suggest?
There are numerous instances of illogical exaggeration of ISIS-Khorasan’s activities by Western and allied media, skillfully inflating the group’s significance and sensationalizing minor incidents. More critically, international institutions and governments have actively amplified the ISIS-K threat, a narrative that media outlets then reinforce, perpetuating the perception of a global danger and keeping the spotlight on this crippled organization.
On February 25, 2024, the United Nations Security Council held a special session on ISIS-K’s threats in Afghanistan and the region. Participants, driven by political and intelligence interests, exaggerated the group’s significance. The head of the UN’s Counter-Terrorism Office declared ISIS-K a major threat to the region and the world, presenting unsubstantiated claims about attempted attacks in Europe and alleging the influx of ‘terrorist’ groups into Afghanistan.
In this session, the U.S. representative also inflated the ISIS-Khorasan threat, deeming it a global menace. Representatives from certain countries absurdly labeled Afghanistan as ISIS’s main hub, despite these nations currently hosting numerous Khorasan branch centers and fighters, where they are trained, funded, and utilized for their own interests.
When comparing the actual ground realities in Afghanistan with the propaganda surrounding ISIS-K, the contrast is stark. ISIS-K does not control any Afghan territory, nor can anyone prove its permanent physical presence. It lacks both financial and human resource supply chains and has no ethnic or ideological support among the Afghan population.
The scale of its destructive activities and attacks has declined significantly, with heavy losses inflicted upon it. Not only is ISIS-K incapable of posing a serious threat beyond Afghanistan, but even within the country, the roots of its remaining disruptive activities can be traced back to foreign countries.
Who Benefits from the Exaggeration of ISIS-K?
Global and regional powers exploit the name of ISIS-K to further their hidden political and strategic agendas. Following their humiliating military defeat in Afghanistan, portraying the country as unstable serves as a convenient strategy to mask their failure and overshadow the Afghan people’s victory. Amplifying the threat of ISIS-Khorasan, exaggerating its influence and even potentially supporting it as part of covert projects allow these powers to apply indirect pressure on the Afghan government. For them, this approach offers a suitable and strategic policy option.
Media outlets connected to major global powers and their intelligence agencies play a significant role in this propaganda. Their goal is to further the interests of their sponsors, and inflating the ISIS-K threat aligns with both their overt and covert agendas.
Local and regional governments also use the ISIS threat as a tool to exert pressure and implement specific policies against rival countries and political opponents. A clear example of this was the recent UN Security Council session, where representatives from certain countries made exaggerated and unfounded claims about ISIS-K, disconnected from reality.
If we compare the casualties caused by ISIS-K’s attacks with the death toll from global conflicts, the difference is staggering. According to figures from biased international organizations, the annual average death toll from ISIS-K attacks in recent years has been around 254.
In contrast, wars waged by Russia and the U.S. have resulted in hundreds or thousands of times more casualties than ISIS-Khorasan’s attacks. The annual death toll from Zionist aggression in Gaza is 141 times higher than ISIS-K’s. Pakistan’s internal conflicts result in seven times more deaths (around 2,000 annually). Shockingly, violent crimes in the U.S. result in about 24,000 deaths per year—approximately 84 times more than ISIS-Khorasan-related incidents.
Yet, ISIS-K continues to be portrayed as a major global threat, receiving significant attention and priority in policy discussions and political agendas.
Meanwhile, the dangers posed by other proxy groups and authoritarian regimes—many of which are actively waging war against their own people, targeting civilians from land and air, and subjecting countless individuals to enforced disappearances and imprisonment—are often overlooked.
The Broader Consequences of ISIS Exaggeration
The policy of inflating ISIS-K’s threat, pursued by states, covert intelligence agencies, international institutions, and media outlets, is disconnected from reality and driven by hidden political motives. Instead of yielding tangible benefits for these actors, it exacerbates regional and global conflicts, prolonging crises and complicating political landscapes.
Moreover, such propaganda strengthens the harmful phenomenon of Islamophobia, diverting attention from real societal issues and wasting valuable resources that could otherwise be used to address genuine crises.
This global propaganda exaggerating the strength of ISIS-K ultimately strengthens the group itself, reinforcing its ranks and bolstering the belief among its members in their cause. Individuals who feel oppressed by the anti-Islam policies of various governments may perceive ISIS-K as a legitimate platform for resistance and justice, drawing them into its ranks.
This is the same disastrous phenomenon that occurred during ISIS’s so-called caliphate, when a large number of young Muslims from the West traveled to Iraq and Syria under the illusion of establishing an Islamic system—only to be trapped in a radical ideology, bombed into oblivion, and ultimately discarded by Western powers.
Conclusion: While ISIS-K does pose a real threat, its exaggerated portrayal serves political and propaganda-driven objectives. Global powers, intelligence networks, and media outlets inflate the group’s presence to justify failed policies, secure hidden interests, and apply indirect pressure on their rivals.
To properly assess real threats, it is essential to rely on logical analysis rather than propaganda. Evaluating the ISIS phenomenon should be based on accurate data, concrete evidence, and a nuanced understanding of the region’s political dynamics—not on narratives crafted to serve particular interests.
Historical experience has shown that artificially inflating the influence of such groups does not solve problems but rather creates new crises. Instead of continuing failed strategies, global actors should reassess the policies that have contributed to the rise of such groups.
