By Akbar Jamal
When circles aligned with the Pakistani military advance the narrative that “the aggressive actions carried out by the Pakistani military regime under the pretext of so-called counterterrorism, together with the weapons allegedly left behind by a defeated United States and supposedly being reclaimed through Pakistan, in fact amount to the completion of ‘America’s unfinished mission,’” the matter cannot be dismissed as a mere political slogan, a fleeting emotional reaction, or a self-manufactured expression of vengeance.
Such a formulation constructs, in its very architecture, a conceptual framework that gives rise to numerous foundational, theoretical, and state-centric questions. These questions transcend the sphere of short-term politics and instead engage with deeper notions of the state, sovereignty, moral principles, and the very idea of regional peace.
Before turning to these questions, however, it is necessary to note that statements invoking the notion of “completing America’s unfinished mission” have, at various times, been advanced by different political and military circles within Pakistan.
This assertion has not remained confined to a single incident or moment in time; rather, it has gradually evolved, amid shifting circumstances, into the contours of a coherent and deliberate narrative. For instance, during the first ten days of October last year, when the Pakistani military undertook an aggressive action in Kabul, purportedly targeting so-called objectives, coinciding with the Afghan Foreign Minister’s visit to India, certain military and pro-military circles sought to justify the attack by declaring:
“The Pakistani military accomplished what the United States was unable to achieve in twenty years.”
On the one hand, this statement amounted to a display of pride incongruent with Islamic ethical principles; on the other, it articulated an intellectual claim, one that, in practical terms, laid the foundation for an entire narrative framework. Within that framework, former U.S. President Donald Trump had earlier warned, in reference to the non-transfer of Bagram Air Base, that “the Taliban will witness very bad events.”
In light of the discourse surrounding the “completion of America’s unfinished mission,” the first and most fundamental question that arises is that of sovereignty.
Pakistan presents itself as a “Muslim nuclear power” and a major “military state,” asserting that its foreign and defense policies are independent, sovereign, and grounded in national interests.
In such a context, when actions carried out beyond Pakistan’s borders are linked, through official or semi-official statements, to the “completion of America’s unfinished mission,” a new perception inevitably emerges. This perception gains further force in light of the historical experiences of the past five decades, as well as the recorded statements of Pakistani politicians and former military officials.
Thus, the question arises with even greater urgency than before: does the Pakistani military regime genuinely formulate its regional policies on the basis of national interests? Or are those policies calibrated in alignment with the strategic priorities of non-Muslim global powers?
This is not merely an accusation. Rather, it constitutes an intellectual interrogation of the very concept of state sovereignty.
The second question is rooted in historical context. The United States’ twenty-year war in Afghanistan concluded in a manner widely perceived as a defeat, marked by a withdrawal that proved deeply unsettling for the American narrative itself. Within the United States, the war has been broadly acknowledged as a costly, unsuccessful, and inconclusive endeavor. American society, media outlets, and research institutions have repeatedly characterized it as a strategic failure.
If, within the context of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), a non-Muslim global power, despite possessing vast military, economic, and political resources, was unable to achieve its objectives, then a logical question arises: how can another country in the region, one that does not command comparable resources or global influence, plausibly consider those same objectives attainable? On the basis of what reasoning, what strategic logic, and what moral justification could such an outcome be deemed achievable against an Islamic Emirate?
The third question pertains to the moral and humanitarian dimension.
Afghanistan is not merely a neighboring country; it is a land bound to Pakistan through centuries of religious, cultural, ethnic, and familial ties. Borders may be political constructs, but human relationships transcend geography.
No military operation, particularly one accompanied by substantiated claims of civilian casualties, can be viewed solely within the narrow framework of a “security operation.” Such actions reverberate across generations: they leave psychological scars, cultivate social resentment, and further entrench regional instability.
The central question, therefore, is whether regional peace can truly be secured through the barrel of a gun, the detonation of bombs, and the projection of force, or whether it is more enduringly achieved through mutual respect, diplomatic engagement, dialogue, and the patient work of confidence-building.
It is also an important point that, from the perspective of the IEA, “the Pakistani nation” and “the army’s specific policy-making generals” are not viewed within a single, undifferentiated framework. Certain state decisions do not necessarily reflect the collective will of an entire people; rather, they often embody the strategic thinking of a limited circle of policymakers.
For this reason, the distinction is repeatedly underscored: the criticism is directed not at a nation or its people, but at particular interventionist policies and their architects. The aim is to ensure that critique remains grounded in reasoned argument, rather than degenerating into hostility that could, God forbid, inflict shared harm upon the peoples of both countries, especially upon Muslims bound by faith, history, and human ties.
The essential point, therefore, is this: if the defense of a particular interventionist policy by Pakistan’s military regime, advanced through political, military, or public circles, is predicated on the claim that it serves to complete the unfinished agenda of a global power, especially a non-Muslim one, then such a claim itself calls into question the moral, political, and theoretical legitimacy of that policy.
Under these circumstances, a fundamental reassessment becomes imperative. For national dignity, regional stability, and the principles of Islamic neighborliness are all directly implicated and potentially compromised by such a posture.
Therefore, beyond the narrative of those who repeatedly fantasize about asserting their power over others, the critical question remains: in which direction is the region’s future headed? Will it be shaped by continued military operations, displays of force, and coercion, or by political foresight, dialogue, mutual respect, and wise diplomatic engagement?
History shows that the pursuit of peace becomes increasingly complicated when sought through aggression. True and lasting security, therefore, can only be restored through wisdom, prudence, sustained dialogue, and ethical consciousness.
