Part 4
By Dr. Humam Khan
Threats from Afghanistan and the Early Foundation of the Pakistani Army
In 1848, when Britain invaded Afghanistan, it placed its loyal ally, Sardar Dost Mohammad Khan, on the throne in Kabul. But this rule was only on the surface. In reality, the region had become a field of rivalry between great powers.
After the death of Dost Mohammad Khan in 1863, relations between Afghanistan and Britain slowly grew tense. The new Amir resisted British influence and moved closer to Russia, a power that was seen as a major rival to Britain.
These were the conditions that, in 1878, ignited the Second Anglo-Afghan War. Britain captured Kabul and installed Yaqub Khan as its puppet Amir. But it soon realized a hard truth: the mountains of Afghanistan are not just geography; they are strongholds of an unbreakable people.
Britain understood that it was impossible to subdue the Afghan nation by force. So it changed its strategy. Instead of direct rule, it sought to ensure that there was a government in Afghanistan that would not pose a threat to its western borders.
In addition, it became clear that Afghanistan would remain a permanent arena of political rivalry between Russia and Britain. For this reason, Britain reshaped its strategy:
– To secure the western borders of India
– To block Russian influence
– To suppress any uprising that could threaten its interests
To achieve these goals, Britain decided to strengthen and better organize its army in western India, now present-day Pakistan.
In this context, British generals such as Lord Roberts (who first served as head of the Frontier Force, later led the invasion of Afghanistan, and in 1885 became commander of the Bengal Army), along with George Mac Munn, came to believe that the army should be drawn from those local tribes that had both fighting ability and loyalty to colonial rule. This idea later became known as the “martial races” theory.
Under this policy, certain regions of the Indian subcontinent were selected, the most important being Jhelum, Rawalpindi, Attock, Kohat, and Buner. Recruitment from these areas began rapidly.
In 1885, when Lord Roberts took command of the Bengal Army, this process accelerated further and expanded to the Madras and Bombay armies. Later, Lord Kitchener made this system more organized and structured.
Kitchener brought major reform to the Royal Indian Army. By 1903, he merged the Bengal, Madras, and Bombay armies into one central force, called the Royal Indian Army. He then divided it into four main commands: Bengal, Punjab, Madras, and Bombay.
The Punjab Command held special importance because it was close to the Afghan border. It was given responsibility for key regions in western India, including Punjab, the Frontier (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), Sindh, and Balochistan. By 1900, more than half of the British Indian Army was made up of these so-called fighting tribes, most of them from Punjab and the Frontier regions.
It was this Punjab Command that later became the main foundation of today’s Pakistani army. For this reason, its formation is seen as the early base of the Pakistan Army, and Lord Kitchener is counted among its founders.
When this whole historical background is considered, it becomes easier to understand that many decisions of the Pakistani army in the late twentieth century were a continuation of that same colonial thinking. For example, during the 1980s war against the Soviet Union, their support was largely driven by strategic interests rather than religious motives alone.
Likewise, even if the Pakistani army has at times supported the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), it was not out of commitment to a religious system. If that were the case, it would have first implemented Sharia within its own country.
In reality, this is a continuation of the same British policy: there should be a government in Kabul that does not stand against their security interests.
And when this background is taken into account, the Pakistani army’s decision after September 11 to cut ties with the IEA and side with the United States can never be called a “U-turn.”
This is because the army was built this way from the start: if the Afghan government did not follow their directions, action would be taken against it, and in its place, another suitable person or a regime of their choosing would be put in power.
