By Saifuddin Wazirwal
According to well-informed security sources, a senior ISIS-K figure identified as Zalmai Badakhshi has been killed in Peshawar. He was the individual who planned the suicide attack on a Kabul Bank branch in Kunduz city on February 11, 2025.
He not only designed the attack but was also regarded as a key operational planner of ISIS-K and a close associate of the group’s so-called leader, Shahab al-Muhajir. Following the incident, and fearing pursuit by the intelligence units of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), he fled to Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa region.
This incident further reinforces a series of reports that informed sources have emphasized for some time, stating that after fleeing Afghanistan, the propaganda and military leadership of ISIS-K relocated to Pakistan’s tribal regions.
Several previous incidents had also confirmed that key figures of ISIS-K are largely based in Pakistan’s tribal areas, where they continue to operate. On a number of occasions, reports have also emerged that these individuals have been targeted by unidentified assailants in those areas.
The areas of Tirah, Tor dara, Orakzai, and Shalman in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have long been cited as safe havens for ISIS-K. These regions are widely considered to fall under the influence and strategic calculations of Pakistan’s security institutions.
For this reason, many analysts believe that ISIS-K is not an independent or autonomous organization, but has effectively turned into a proxy network within Pakistan’s intelligence games. In their view, the continued presence of such groups serves as a major threat and a tool of pressure for sustaining instability in Afghanistan, the region, and even beyond. This is why, according to these assessments, a particular circle within Pakistan’s military regime provides safe havens for ISIS-K leaders, allowing them to organize and direct their activities from those areas.
The case of Zalmai Badakhshi appears to be another link in this same puzzle. After fleeing Afghanistan, he moved directly to areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, locations that are often described as centers for the regrouping of ISIS-K.
This development strengthens the possibility that the ISIS-K network in the region is not merely a random collection of a few insurgent individuals, but rather part of a broader network that possesses training facilities, financial support, and safe havens inside Pakistan.
Another important point is that the countries financing and supporting ISIS deliberately keep the regional environment turbulent, so that no obstacles arise to hinder the operations of terrorist groups such as ISIS. This situation has led some analysts to conclude that ISIS has effectively become a proxy force.
Historically, this is not a new phenomenon, as certain states have repeatedly used proxy armed groups to pursue their strategic objectives.
Overall, the Peshawar incident is not merely the news of the killing of a single planner; rather, it forms part of a broader puzzle concerning the real backers of ISIS-K and the geography of its operations.
Until the primary sources of funding, training, and safe havens for terrorist networks are dismantled, the complete eradication of such groups will remain an extremely difficult task.